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NOTES
BLIND JUSTICE AND JUST ARBITRATORS:
UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT’S EVIDENT PARTIALITY STANDARD
Heather Cameron*
Arbitral awards are intended to be binding on parties who subject their
disputes to arbitration. However, an arbitrator’s bias in favor of one of the
parties is one of the few grounds on which a party can object to such an
award. The standard used to evaluate such bias is known as “evident
partiality.”
This Note examines two commonly used standards—referred to in this
Note as the “possible impression” standard and the “likely actual bias”
standard—deployed by U.S. courts to define evident partiality and determine
whether the requirements for vacating an arbitral award have been fulfilled.
This Note advocates that likely actual bias is the correct standard by which
courts should determine whether an arbitral award should be vacated for
evident partiality ex post—that is, after arbitration. This Note further
advocates for a private law solution, which would apply the less demanding
possible impression standard to arbitrators’ required disclosures ex ante—
before arbitration—and impose an affirmative duty on parties to investigate
arbitrators’ potential biases.
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INTRODUCTION
A large, nationwide bank just lost its case in arbitration and, desperate to
overturn the unfavorable award, hires a private investigator to look into the
arbitrator’s background.1 The investigator discovers that ten years earlier,
the arbitrator opened an account with the bank under her maiden name but
closed it after just a year and a half when she got married, changed her last
name, and opened a new account with a different bank. Before the
arbitration, the arbitrator did not disclose her maiden name or the fact that
she briefly had an account with one of the parties many years prior. The bank
now moves to have the award vacated, claiming that this undisclosed piece
of information indicates that the arbitrator was—or at least may have been—
biased against it.
The judge evaluating the bank’s motion for vacatur must decide which of
two possible standards to use to evaluate the claim. One standard, the “likely
actual bias” standard, would allow vacatur only where the facts create a
reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s likely actual bias toward one of the
parties.2 The other standard, the “possible impression” standard, would
allow vacatur where there is a possible impression of bias.3
1. The hypothetical in this introduction was created for the purposes of this Note to
illustrate a problem witnessed in practice. See Lee Korland, What an Arbitrator Should
Investigate and Disclose: Proposing a New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 815, 816 (2003) (“Displeased parties will often
conduct thorough background investigations following the arbitration award for the sole
purpose of uncovering . . . an undisclosed conflict that might allow for a successful challenge
to the arbitration decision.”).
2. See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that “evident partiality” means a reasonable person
would have to conclude that an arbitrator actually was partial in favor of one of the parties to
arbitration).
3. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
“evident partiality” includes the mere appearance of an arbitrator’s bias in favor of one of the
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Under the possible impression standard, the judge would likely grant the
motion and vacate the award. A reasonable person could, after all, believe
the fact that the arbitrator once had an account with one of the parties, and
that she failed to disclose that fact, raises the possibility of her bias against
that party. It is possible that she had a negative experience transacting with
the first bank and failed to disclose her maiden name or the existence of her
old account in hopes that the bank would not find out and learn of her
negative feelings.
Application of the likely actual bias standard, on the other hand, would
likely produce the opposite result. Would a reasonable person think it likely
that the arbitrator actually was biased against the bank because she briefly
had an account with the bank many years prior? Probably not. Large,
nationwide banks have millions of account holders, and there are plenty of
innocuous reasons someone might switch banks. Would a reasonable person
think the arbitrator failed to disclose her maiden name in an attempt to
conceal her bias? Again, probably not. It seems more likely that she did not
think to list her maiden name because she has not used it in many years and
did not think it bore any relevance to the arbitration.
The standard that the judge applies to evaluate this claim of the arbitrator’s
evident partiality is likely dispositive to the motion’s outcome and, therefore,
crucial to the final and binding nature of the judgment and award.4
When bringing a dispute before a judge, litigants have extremely high
Should those
expectations as to their adjudicator’s impartiality.5
expectations be the same when parties contract to resolve their disputes in
private arbitration, or is there reason to expect—or at least accept—a
different standard for arbitrators? Arbitrators are often selected by the parties
precisely because of their expertise in the relevant field.6 However, with
expertise comes connections, and with connections come the risk that
arbitrators may exhibit bias in favor of—or against—the side with whom they
have some prior relationship.7

parties to arbitration). Courts and commentators use a variety of terms to describe these
differing standards. See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. For the sake of clarity, this
Note refers to them as the “likely actual bias” standard and the “possible impression” standard
throughout.
4. See Korland, supra note 1, at 815 (“[P]arties to a disagreement frequently look to
arbitration for its finality, since an arbitration award creates fewer grounds for judicial review
than does typical litigation.”).
5. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019)
(noting that where there exists potential bias on the part of a judge—despite a lack of actual,
subjective bias—the Due Process Clause requires automatic disqualification or recusal), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.); see also Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1024 (8th
Cir. 2012) (holding that the mere appearance of impartiality by a judge constitutes a
compelling state interest).
6. See Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83; Korland, supra note 1, at 815.
7. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(discussing the arbitrator’s extensive experience in the local legal community, her resulting
connections to individuals within the relevant industry, and one party’s motion to vacate the
award, in part, on the basis of the arbitrator’s evident partiality in favor of the other party).
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To ensure fairness to the parties, it is crucial to determine which types of
relationships or connections have the potential to create bias and when that
risk is great enough to require disclosure to the parties. Protecting the finality
of arbitral awards requires an exacting analysis of such connections. Courts
must make this determination when deciding whether to take the drastic
action of stepping in to vacate an award intended to be final, binding, and
independent of the courts.8 To that end, it must be settled whether the party
seeking to have the award vacated must show that the arbitrator was, in fact,
partial toward the other party, whether the mere possibility of bias is
sufficient, or if the appropriate standard lies somewhere in between.
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act9 (FAA) grants courts the
authority to vacate an arbitral award “where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of [the parties].”10 The meaning of
“evident partiality” has been the subject of much litigation over the past fifty
years, recently almost reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in the spring of 2020
in Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC.11 The Court denied certiorari
on Monster Energy’s petition—which asked for clarification of the evident
partiality standard—and left standing a circuit split on the issue.12
A majority of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have applied
a standard requiring that “a reasonable person would have to conclude that
an arbitrator was partial to one party to an arbitration” to justify vacatur of
an arbitral award.13 A minority of circuits that have addressed the issue,
however, have interpreted evident partiality as essentially coextensive with
the judicial standard for bias, requiring that arbitrators must not only be
unbiased “but must also avoid even the appearance of bias.”14
8. See Korland, supra note 1, at 815 (“[The] benefits [of arbitration] include expedience,
the reduced costs that can be realized by avoiding protracted court battles, and the fact that
arbitrators often have unique expertise and knowledge about certain industry or businessspecific matters that make them preferable to a judge or jury.”).
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15.
10. Id. § 10(a)(2).
11. 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.).
12. Monster Energy, 141 S. Ct. 164; see also Heather Cameron, Decided, Granted,
Denied: A Look at 2020’s Supreme Court Arbitration Cases, 38 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG.
118, 131–32 (2020).
13. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Monster Energy, 940 F.3d 1130 (No. 191333); see, e.g., Cooper v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 2016);
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 2013); JCI Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2003); ANR
Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999); Andersons, Inc. v.
Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 328 (6th Cir. 1998); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist.
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984).
14. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968); see
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18 (“The minority, led by the Ninth Circuit,
find evident partiality anytime an arbitrator does not disclose a fact that could create a
‘reasonable impression’ of bias . . . equat[ing] its ‘reasonable impression of partiality’
standard for vacatur of arbitration awards with the ‘appearance of bias’ standard for judge
recusal.”); see, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1146 (9th Cir. 1994); Middlesex Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982). When determining whether a judge
must be disqualified for bias, courts apply an objective test, asking “not whether the judge is
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be
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Without clarification on which definition of evident partiality is correct,
there may be “endless litigation over arbitrations that were intended to finally
resolve disputes outside the court system.”15 Considering that certainty and
control are among the qualities parties find most beneficial and appealing
about commercial arbitration,16 a resolution to this question is valuable for
the sake of predictability alone. Additionally, to protect arbitral neutrality—
both the professional reputations of arbitrators17 and the general integrity of
arbitration as a neutral method of private dispute resolution—while
preserving the finality of arbitral awards, the Supreme Court must weigh in
and clarify the standard.
When the FAA was enacted, it was not intended to apply outside the
commercial arbitration context,18 but as arbitration in the United States
expanded, the Supreme Court took a trans-substantive approach to its FAA
jurisprudence.19 This means that decisions made with one form of arbitration
in mind end up applying to all forms of arbitration.20 While the issue of
evident partiality has implications for more controversial areas like
consumer, employment, and civil rights arbitrations,21 this Note focuses
exclusively on commercial arbitration.22
Part I of this Note examines the history of the evident partiality standard,
including the FAA’s enactment and the Supreme Court’s only case to address
the evident partiality standard, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co.23 Part II looks at the way lower courts have
interpreted the standard established by Commonwealth Coatings, the circuit
split that has developed, and the Ninth Circuit’s controversial ruling in
neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” See Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009).
15. Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1141 (Friedland, J., dissenting).
16. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 73, 86 (2d ed. 2014).
17. See, e.g., OOGC Am., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 975 F.3d 449, 452–53 (5th
Cir. 2020) (“[The arbitrator] argued that intervention [into the district court’s decision] was
necessary to protect ‘his reputation for veracity and integrity, which has been harmed by the
Opinion’s statements that he is a liar and corrupt.’” (quoting Motion to Intervene by Defendant
Patrick Long, OOGC Am., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. 17-248, 2018 WL
6333830 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2018), vacated, OOGC Am., 975 F.3d 449)).
18. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV.
1119, 1134 (2019) (“According to scholars, the [FAA] ‘was originally designed to cover
contractual disputes between merchants of relatively co-equal bargaining power.’” (quoting
Imre S. Szalai, Reconciling Fault Lines in Arbitration and Redefining Arbitration Through the
Broader Lens of Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 511, 524–25 (2018))); Jay E. Grenig, Evolution of
the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Resolving Employment Disputes, 71 DISP.
RESOL. J. 99, 108–10 (2016).
19. See Bookman, supra note 18, at 1171–72.
20. See id. at 1187 (“This trans-substantivity also deserves criticism for making arbitration
decisions in other contexts apply to international commercial arbitration, often to the detriment
of private law and international business values that are particularly important in international
commercial arbitration.”).
21. See Cameron, supra note 12, at 131.
22. Defining and applying evident partiality in the commercial arbitration context is
complicated in its own right, therefore, discussion of evident partiality as it applies to other
types of arbitration is beyond the scope of this Note.
23. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Monster Energy. Part III argues for uniform adoption of the likely actual
bias standard when courts review arbitral decisions and advocates for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the issue and clarify the standard. Part
III also discusses the need for explicit, uniform disclosure guidelines for
arbitrators and argues for a private law solution. This part advocates for both
arbitral providers and individual arbitrators to apply the possible impression
standard when evaluating required disclosures and to impose an affirmative
duty on parties to investigate arbitrators’ disclosures.
I. THE ORIGINS OF EVIDENT PARTIALITY
Arbitration has a reputation for speed and inexpensiveness relative to
traditional litigation,24 promises relief for overloaded court dockets,25 and
gives parties the ability to designate trade-specific arbiters.26 Despite these
features, courts were traditionally hostile toward arbitration, deeming it an
inferior process that could not give parties the same quality of justice
available to them in courts.27 Over the course of the twentieth century, the
judiciary’s attitude toward arbitration shifted, and today, the Supreme Court
is decidedly pro-arbitration.28 Arbitral awards can only be challenged on
very narrow grounds,29 and one of the most common of those narrow
grounds—evident partiality30—has been addressed by the Supreme Court
only once.31
Part I.A of this section discusses the history of the legal provision under
which parties can challenge an arbitral award for evident partiality. Part I.B
24. See Elizabeth A. Murphy, Note, Standards of Arbitrator Impartiality: How Impartial
Must They Be?: Lifecare International, Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 463,
466. But see Bookman, supra note 18, at 1165 (“[Arbitration] is expensive. It can be far from
speedy.”).
25. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 466.
26. See Ronán Feehily, Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality in International
Commercial Arbitration, A Fine Balance in the Quest for Arbitral Justice, 7 PENN ST. J.L. &
INT’L AFFS., no. 1, 2019, at 88, 102 (“[E]xperts in particular industries, disciplines and legal
communities have contacts and relationships with the parties and their counsel, and . . .
disqualifying experienced individuals based on such factors is not required to preserve
impartiality and would deprive the parties of competent experienced specialists to decide on
their disputes.”).
27. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 466.
28. See Bookman, supra note 18, at 1120–21; see also Stephen Friedman, Arbitration
Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2036 (2011).
29. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (noting that § 10
of the FAA only authorizes vacatur for “egregious departures from the parties’ agreed-upon
arbitration”); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1992) (“[A]rbitration
awards are generally immune from judicial review.” (quoting Nogueiro v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 250 Cal. Rptr. 478, 479 (Ct. App. 1988))); Korland, supra note 1, at 815 (noting that
there are fewer grounds for judicial review in arbitration than in typical litigation).
30. See Kathryn A. Windsor, Comment, Defining Arbitrator Evident Partiality: The
Catch-22 of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191, 192 (2009); see
also Korland, supra note 1, at 815 (“One common means of challenging an arbitration award
is for the losing party to claim that a supposedly neutral arbitrator was partial to the other party
in the dispute.”).
31. See generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968);
see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 3–4.
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discusses the Court’s fragmented opinion in its first and only case addressing
the standard: Commonwealth Coatings.
A. The FAA’s Evident Partiality Standard
Congress enacted the FAA32 in 1925 in response to judicial hostility
toward arbitration agreements.33 The FAA was intended to set arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other types of contracts.34 Section 10
of the FAA lays out the conditions on which an arbitration award can be
vacated.35 In addition to evident partiality, grounds for vacatur include
corruption, fraud, undue means, misconduct, misbehavior, or an overreach of
power by the arbitrator(s).36
Though the grounds for challenging an award are intentionally limited,37
their availability under appropriate circumstances is vital to maintaining
parties’ confidence in the arbitration process’s fairness.38 Arbitration has
become an increasingly widespread method of dispute resolution,39 so
maintaining confidence in the institution is crucial.40
B. Commonwealth Coatings
Since the FAA’s 1925 enactment, the Supreme Court has examined the
evident partiality standard only one time.41 Fifty-three years ago, in
Commonwealth Coatings, a majority of the Justices agreed to overturn the

32. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 833 (1925) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
9 U.S.C.).
33. See Cynthia A. Murray, Note, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 635
(2002).
34. See id. at 635.
35. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration—(1) where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
37. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (“[L]imited
review [is] needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightaway.”).
38. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 475.
39. See Korland, supra note 1, at 817–18; Braydon Roberts, Note, An Evident
Contradiction: How Some Evident Partiality Standards Do Not Facilitate Impartial
Arbitration, 43 J. CORP. L. 681, 697 (2018).
40. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 476 (“Unhappy with unjust results, the public may
refuse to arbitrate agreements and cause all the efficiency benefits of the process to be lost.”).
41. See generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
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award in question on the grounds of evident partiality by one of the three
arbitrators, but no clear rationale emerged.42
The case involved a dispute over a painting job in Puerto Rico between the
prime contractor, respondent Continental Casualty, and the subcontractor,
petitioner Commonwealth Coatings43 The contract for the painting job
included an arbitration agreement, and each party selected an arbitrator who,
together, selected a third neutral arbitrator.44 The third arbitrator had done
sporadic but repeated and significant business with the prime contractor,
including rendering services on the projects at issue in the immediate
dispute.45 This fact was not disclosed to the subcontractor by the arbitrator
or the prime contractor until after an award was issued.46 The subcontractor
challenged the arbitration award on, among other grounds, evident partiality,
but the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico declined to vacate
the award, and the First Circuit affirmed before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.47
1. Justice Black’s Opinion
The opinion of the Court,48 written by Justice Hugo Black, interpreted
evident partiality as coextensive with the judicial bias standard, requiring that
arbitrators must not only be unbiased “but also must avoid even the
appearance of bias.”49 Justice Black acknowledged that there was nothing in
the facts of the case to suggest improper motives on the part of the third
arbitrator other than his undisclosed business relationship with the prime
contractor.50 However, he noted that if a similar undisclosed relationship
was discovered between a litigant and a judge or the foreman of a jury, the
42. See generally id.; see also Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984); Feehily, supra note 26, at 101.
43. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146.
44. See id. Arbitration agreements typically provide for either one or three arbitrators and
designate the mechanism for their appointment. See BORN, supra note 16, at 207. The
arbitration agreement in Commonwealth Coatings designated a three-arbitrator tribunal,
requiring each party to select one arbitrator and for those two party-appointed arbitrators to
appoint a third. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146.
45. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. This Note refers to Justice Hugo Black’s opinion simply as the “opinion of the Court,”
rather than the “majority opinion” or the “plurality opinion,” to acknowledge the debate
among the circuits over its classification. See infra note 85. A plurality opinion is one “lacking
enough judges’ votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any other
opinion.” Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Plurality opinions arise in the
U.S. Supreme Court when a majority of Justices agree on a case’s outcome but not on the
reasons for that outcome, and they sometimes present lower courts with complicated and
unclear direction as to what constitutes the resulting binding precedent. See Ryan C. Williams,
Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795,
795 (2017). Determining whether Justice Black’s opinion constitutes a majority or a plurality
opinion, while related, is ultimately secondary to the substantive question of how to interpret
and apply the evident partiality standard and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this Note.
49. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
50. See id. at 147.
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judgment in that case would be subject to challenge.51 In his opinion, Justice
Black wrote that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose his relationship with the
prime contractor constituted a “manifest violation of the strict morality and
fairness Congress would have expected on the part of the arbitrator and the
other party in [the] case.”52 Because the judicial impartiality requirement is
a constitutional principle, Justice Black saw no reason to interpret § 10’s
statutory language as imposing a different standard when applied to
arbitration proceedings.53
Despite acknowledging that it would be unrealistic to expect arbitrators to
sever all ties with the business world, Justice Black wrote that their
connections actually call for even more scrupulous safeguarding of their
impartiality than is needed with judges because arbitrators have free rein to
decide questions of law and fact without the safeguard of appellate review.54
He did not expect that requiring arbitrators to disclose to parties “any
dealings that might create an impression of possible bias” would impair
arbitration’s effectiveness as a process.55 In fact, though conceding they
were not controlling in the immediate case, Justice Black pointed out that the
American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) then effective rules asked
prospective arbitrators to disclose circumstances that might create a
presumption of bias or disqualify them as being impartial.56
Justice Black concluded that any judicial or arbitral tribunal permitted to
try cases and controversies must be unbiased in fact and must also “avoid
even the appearance of bias.”57 He found it impossible to imagine Congress
intended to allow parties to submit their claims to arbitrators who might
reasonably be perceived as biased in favor of or against one of the parties.58
2. Justice White’s Concurrence
Two of the five Justices joining Justice Black’s opinion also joined a
narrowing concurrence authored by Justice Byron White.59 Justice White
clarified that the Court’s opinion should not be understood to mean that
arbitrators should be held to the same standards of judicial decorum as Article
III or, for that matter, any judges.60 He emphasized that it is often because,
51. See id. at 148.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 148–49.
55. Id. at 149.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 150.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 150–52 (White, J., concurring); see also Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C.
Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984) (“It might be
thought that Justice Black’s opinion represents the views of six members of the Court, for
Justice White wrote that he was ‘glad to join my Brother Black’s opinion.’ Because the two
opinions are impossible to reconcile, however, we must narrow the holding to that subscribed
to by both Justices White and Black.” (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150
(White, J., concurring))).
60. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
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not in spite, of arbitrators’ connections to their industries that they are
effective adjudicators.61 Therefore, Justice White wrote, arbitrators should
not automatically be disqualified because of a business relationship with one
of the parties, as long as either (1) both parties are informed of the
relationship in advance of the arbitration or (2) the relationship is too trivial
to require disclosure.62
He went on to emphasize the importance of limiting courts’ involvement
in evaluating an arbitrator’s neutrality since the parties themselves are in a
better position to do so.63 The parties “are the architects of their own
arbitration process” and are better informed about arbitrators’ reputations and
the accepted ethical standards within their own line of business.64
Justice White’s solution was to require arbitrators to disclose any past or
present financial transactions with either party to both parties at the outset of
the process.65 That way both parties would be able to make an informed
decision about the arbitrator’s ability to act as an impartial adjudicator to their
dispute, and the arbitrator would not need to worry that the very act of
voluntarily revealing an insubstantial business relationship might suggest
partisanship.66 By legally requiring such disclosure up front, arbitrators and
parties would wholly avoid a relationship coming to light after arbitration
and “a suspicious or disgruntled party . . . seiz[ing] on it as a pretext for
invalidating the award.”67
Justice White noted that arbitrators might have remote business
relationships with a large number of people, so it would be unrealistic to
expect them to divulge every commercial connection to the parties.68 For the
present case, Justice White wrote it was sufficient to hold that, since the
arbitrator had a substantial interest in a firm that had done more than trivial
business with one of the parties, he was required to disclose that fact.69
Justice White optimistically suggested that if arbitrators err on the side of
disclosure, it should not be hard for courts to determine which undisclosed
relationships are too insignificant to warrant vacatur under § 10(a)(2).70
Unlike Justice Black’s opinion for the Court,71 the concurrence claimed to
hold that the bias disqualification standard for federal judges does not
establish evident partiality on the part of an arbitrator.72

61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 151.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id. (“In many cases the arbitrator might believe the business relationship to be so
insubstantial that to make a point of revealing it would suggest he is indeed easily swayed,
and perhaps a partisan of that party.”).
67. Id.; see infra Part III.C.
68. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 151–52.
70. See id. at 152.
71. See id. at 150 (opinion of the Court).
72. See id. (White, J., concurring).
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3. Justice Fortas’s Dissent
In a dissent joined by two others, Justice Abe Fortas wrote that he would
affirm the lower courts’ decisions finding no evident partiality and uphold
the arbitration award.73 He found that where there existed no claim of actual
partiality, unfairness, or misconduct, § 10(a) could not support a finding of
evident partiality.74
The dissent’s position is helpful in clarifying the common thread between
Justice Black’s opinion for the Court and Justice White’s concurrence.75
Neither the opinion of the Court nor the concurrence held that evidence of
actual bias or partiality on the part of an arbitrator is required to vacate an
award for evident partiality.76 The dissent would have interpreted the term
to require such evidence.77 It is, therefore, clear from Commonwealth
Coatings that evident partiality does not mean actual partiality.78 Left
uncertain in the wake of Commonwealth Coatings was whether the mere
appearance of possible bias is sufficient to warrant vacatur for evident
partiality, as Justice Black wrote,79 or if something more must be shown, as
Justice White indicated.80 If something more is required to warrant vacatur
for evident partiality, Commonwealth Coatings also left unclear what that
additional showing entails.81
II. A BLACK AND WHITE CIRCUIT SPLIT?
Following the Court’s Commonwealth Coatings decision, the combination
of uncertainty about the reasonable impression of bias standard82 and a lack
of clarity on what constitutes what Justice White called an arbitrator’s
“substantial interest” in a firm that had done more than trivial business with
one of the parties,83 has resulted in a “fact-sensitive, case-by-case inquiry
into each dispute with little predictability as to future outcomes.”84 Courts
73. See id. at 152 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 155.
75. Compare id. at 152 (finding that “[t]he facts in this case do not lend themselves to the
Court’s ruling” since there was “no claim . . . of actual partiality, unfairness, bias, or fraud”),
with id. at 147 (opinion of the Court) (holding that there was evident partiality despite the
petitioner’s failure to allege “that the third arbitrator was actually guilty of fraud or bias”), and
id. at 151–52 (White, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court’s holding).
76. See id. at 147 (opinion of the Court) (“It is true that petitioner does not charge before
us that the third arbitrator was actually guilty of fraud or bias in deciding this case, and we
have no reason, apart from the undisclosed business relationship, to suspect him of any
improper motives.”); id. at 151–52 (White, J., concurring) (holding that failure to disclose a
nontrivial business relationship with one of the parties is sufficient to find evident partiality).
By negative implication, Justice White’s concurrence finds that proof of actual bias is not
necessary to find evident partiality. Id.
77. See id. at 152 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 147 (opinion of the Court).
79. See id. at 150.
80. See id. at 151–52 (White, J., concurring).
81. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 470.
82. See supra Part I.B.
83. See supra Part I.B.2.
84. Windsor, supra note 30, at 198.
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disagree on whether Justice Black’s or Justice White’s opinion was
controlling and which portions of each constitute dicta.85
Part II.A discusses the circuit split that has developed over how to interpret
Commonwealth Coatings and the majority and minority standards adopted
by the courts. Part II.B discusses Monster Energy, a relatively recent Ninth
Circuit case addressing evident partiality, which highlights the significant
differences between the standards.86
A. Interpretations of the Evident Partiality Standard in the Wake of
Commonwealth Coatings
Since Commonwealth Coatings, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Circuits—a majority of those that have addressed the issue—have
required parties seeking vacatur of an arbitral award for evident partiality to
show that “a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was
partial to one party to the arbitration.”87 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits—
a minority of the circuits to address the issue—have adopted a less
demanding standard that authorizes vacatur for the “reasonable impression
of partiality.”88
Different sources describe these standards in a number of ways under a
dizzying variety of names.89 The majority standard has been characterized
85. Compare Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that Justice Black’s opinion constituted a
plurality, so Justice White’s concurrence narrowed the holding), with Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20
F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that despite the apparent contradiction between
Justice Black’s opinion and Justice White’s concurrence, Black’s opinion, including its
“appearance of bias” language, constituted a majority because it received at least five votes).
86. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.).
87. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 19 (quoting Morelite, 748 F.2d
at 84)); see, e.g., Cooper v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 2016);
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 2013); JCI Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2003); ANR
Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999); Andersons, Inc. v.
Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 328 (6th Cir. 1998); Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83–84.
88. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 22; see, e.g., Schmitz, 20 F.3d
at 1046; Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982).
89. See, e.g., Freeman, 709 F.3d at 253 (“An arbitrator is evidently partial only if a
reasonable person would have to conclude that she was partial to one side.”); JCI Commc’ns,
324 F.3d at 51 (“Evident partiality is more than just the appearance of possible bias.”);
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1047 (“‘Reasonable impression of partiality’ . . . is the best expression of
the Commonwealth Coatings court’s holding.”); Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84 (“[W]e hold that
‘evident partiality’ within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reasonable
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”);
Windsor, supra note 30, at 192 n.10 (“The three interpretations [of evident partiality] are: (1)
that arbitrators are expected to be ‘completely impartial,’ with absolutely ‘no connection with
the parties or the dispute involved which might give the appearance of partiality’ unless
otherwise agreed to by the parties; (2) that ‘an appearance of bias’ will only disqualify an
arbitrator where an arbitrator exhibits some sort of personal interest, e.g., a pecuniary interest;
and (3) that a ‘reasonable impression of partiality’ establishes when an arbitrator possesses a
duty to disclose.” (citations omitted) (quoting 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution
§ 138 (2008))); id. (observing “that arbitrator evident partiality consists of a ‘middle ground’

2021]

BLIND JUSTICE AND JUST ARBITRATORS

2245

as requiring sufficiently obvious bias that a reasonable person would easily
recognize90 or bias such that a reasonable person would necessarily conclude
that there was partiality.91 This is what this Note refers to as the “likely actual
bias” standard. The minority standard has been called “appearance of
bias,”92 “mere ‘appearance of bias,’”93 an “impression of possible bias,”94
the “appearance of partiality,”95 a “reasonable impression of partiality,”96
and the “specter of partiality.”97 This Note refers to this as the “possible
impression” standard.
Both the majority and minority standard—whether explicitly or
implicitly—use the “reasonable person” concept, which asks what a
hypothetical rational, typical person would think or do.98 The majority and
minority approaches both require courts to determine whether a reasonable
person would perceive bias.99 The salient difference between the standards
is how likely that bias must be: whether a reasonable person must believe
the arbitrator actually was biased or if the mere possibility of the arbitrator’s
bias is sufficient.
1. The Possible Impression Standard
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the minority’s possible
impression standard.100 This standard presents the party challenging an
between the ‘appearance of bias’ standard and the ‘actual bias’ standard” (quoting 4 AM. JUR.
2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008))).
90. See Freeman, 709 F.3d at 251–53.
91. See JCI Commc’ns, 324 F.3d at 51.
92. Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83; Windsor, supra note 30, at 192 n.10.
93. Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83–84.
94. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
95. Windsor, supra note 30, at 192 & n.10.
96. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 162 v. Jason Mfg., Inc., 900 F.2d 1392,
1398 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 420 v. Kinney
Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1985)); Windsor, supra note 30, at 192
n.10.
97. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.).
98. See OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Sheldon M. Novick ed.,
Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1991) (1881) (“The law considers . . . what would be blameworthy in the
average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by
that.”); see also James M. Kramon, Law and Literature Series: Truth in Fiction and Law,
MD. BAR J., Mar./Apr. 2010, at 46, 48–49.
99. See Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1137 (noting that several states within the Ninth
Circuit have adopted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, which requires arbitrators to
disclose all known facts that a reasonable person would think likely to affect the arbitrator’s
ability to be impartial and establishes a presumption of evident partiality for failure to do so);
Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d
Cir. 1984) (“[W]e hold that ‘evident partiality’ within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will be
found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one
party to the arbitration.”); Windsor, supra note 30, at 212 (noting that courts use an objective
“reasonable person” standard in their arbitrator impartiality calculus).
100. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Other courts facing the
same issue have held that ‘evident partiality’ is present when undisclosed facts show ‘a
reasonable impression of partiality.’ Our examination . . . persuades us . . . that this
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award with a lower hurdle than the majority standard—likely actual bias—
because “circumstances can convey an impression of partiality without
necessarily dictating a conclusion of partiality.”101
In Schmitz v. Zilveti,102 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that since Justice White
joined in Justice Black’s “majority opinion” and only wrote separately to
make “additional remarks,” Justice Black’s opinion constituted a controlling
majority rather than a mere plurality.103 The court found that despite stating
that the partiality standard for arbitrators is not the same as the standard
applicable to judges, Justice White did not explicitly reject Justice Black’s
“appearance of bias” language, meaning that the “appearance of bias”
standard received a majority of the Court’s votes.104
The Ninth Circuit held that the concurrence simply pointed out that,
because arbitrators are often experts within their respective fields, they have
many more potential conflicts of interest than judges.105 Unlike judges,
arbitrators are required only to disclose those potential conflicts; they are not
required to recuse themselves.106
Thus, in Schmitz, the Ninth Circuit found that the easier-to-meet
“impression of possible bias,” the possible impression standard, best supports
the policies of § 10 of the FAA, which aims to encourage disclosure and
indicates that the standard for nondisclosure cases should be different than
the standard for actual bias cases.107 Parties can only select their arbitrators
intelligently when arbitrators disclose all facts that might give rise to their
possible partiality, and “[w]hether the arbitrators’ decision itself is faulty is
not necessarily relevant.”108
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the rule from Commonwealth
Coatings as “somewhat analogous to a per se rule” or an irrebuttable
presumption that requires setting aside an award once it is established that
the arbitrator actually knew of, but failed to disclose, potentially prejudicial
facts that could have impaired the arbitrator’s judgment.109 The Eleventh
Circuit clearly outlined what the court recognizes as the two circumstances
under which vacatur for evident partiality is appropriate: when (1) there is
an actual conflict or (2) “the arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose,

formulation is the most succinct expression of the Commonwealth Coatings standard.”
(quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982))).
101. See Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1997).
102. 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. See id. at 1045 (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
145, 150, 151 n.* (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
104. See id. at 1046.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1047.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Overseas Priv. Inv. Corp. v. Anaconda Co., 418 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D.D.C. 1976)).
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information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential
conflict exists.”110
2. The Likely Actual Bias Standard
The majority of circuits, on the other hand, have set a higher bar for parties
seeking vacatur under § 10(a)(2).111 In stark contrast with the Ninth Circuit,
the Second Circuit held that Justice Black’s opinion was a plurality, receiving
votes from only four of the nine Justices, and thus was not controlling.112
Justice White, the Second Circuit wrote, concurred in the judgment but
explicitly rejected the holding in Justice Black’s opinion that the ethical
standards for arbitrators and judges are coextensive.113 Finding that much of
Justice Black’s opinion was therefore dicta,114 the Second Circuit attempted
to make sense of the appropriate standard by examining its own prior
decisions.115
Weighing arbitration’s competing interests of employing expert arbitrators
and maintaining impartiality, the court read § 10 to require “a showing of
something more than the mere ‘appearance of bias’ to vacate an arbitration
award” because allowing vacatur under such a low standard would render
arbitration ineffective in a number of commercial settings.116 The court
found that requiring proof of actual bias was an equally unappealing
standard, noting that such an “insurmountable” and “often impossible
[standard] to ‘prove’” would diminish the public’s confidence in arbitration’s
fairness.117
With appearance of bias too low a standard and proof of actual bias too
high, the Second Circuit settled in the middle, holding that evident partiality
means “a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was
partial to one party to the arbitration.”118 The court’s holding clarified that
the standard it adopted falls between possible and actual bias.119 Therefore,
as it is used in this Note, likely actual bias means that there is persuasive
110. Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339
(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Tr. v. ADM Inv. Servs., Inc., 146
F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998)).
111. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
112. See Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748
F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. See id. at 82–83.
114. See id. at 83 n.3 (“Because the two opinions are impossible to reconcile, however, we
must narrow the holding to that subscribed to by both Justices White and Black.”).
115. See id. at 83 (citing Int’l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1981)).
116. Id. at 83–84.
117. Id. at 84 (“Such a standard, we fear, occasionally would require that we enforce
awards in situations that are clearly repugnant to our sense of fairness, yet do not yield ‘proof’
of anything.”).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 85 (“We do not intend to hold arbitrators to all the standards of Canon 3.
Neither do we intend that unsuccessful parties to arbitration may have awards set aside by
seeking out and finding tenuous relationships between the arbitrator and the successful party.
We hold only that the uncontested relationship here at issue is such that reasonable people
would have to believe it provides strong evidence of partiality by the arbitrator.”).
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evidence of partiality, rather than mere speculation or possibility, but it does
not require proof that the arbitrator actually was biased.
The Third Circuit, following the Second Circuit, also argued that a plain
reading of the text120 of § 10(a)(2) supports the application of the likely
actual bias standard.121 “The word ‘evident’ suggests that the statute requires
more than a vague appearance of bias. Rather, the arbitrator’s bias must be
sufficiently obvious that a reasonable person would easily recognize it.”122
In addition to the Third Circuit, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits
have all also adopted the Second Circuit’s more demanding likely actual bias
evident partiality standard.123 In addition to adopting the majority standard,
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have all explicitly rejected the
minority’s possible impression standard akin to the standard for judge
disqualification.124
B. The Standard Articulated in Monster Energy
In 2006, City Beverages, doing business as Olympic Eagle Distributing,
and Monster Energy signed a fixed-term contract giving Olympic exclusive
distribution rights for Monster products within a specified territory.125 In
2015, Olympic alleged that Monster committed breach of contract by
terminating the distribution agreement without good cause when Monster
exercised the contract’s clause permitting termination as long as it paid a
severance fee of $2.5 million.126 Olympic rejected payment, citing a state
law prohibiting termination of franchise contracts absent good cause.127
Monster’s move was upheld in arbitration before JAMS,128 the arbitration

120. See Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Statutory
interpretation requires that we begin with a careful reading of the text.”).
121. See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 2013)
(noting that the statutory language indicates that evident partiality requires a stronger showing
than the appearance standard—“namely, partiality that is evident”).
122. Id.
123. See Cooper v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 2016); JCI
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir.
2003) (“[E]vident partiality means a situation in which ‘a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to an arbitration.’” (quoting Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2002))); ANR Coal Co. v.
Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999); Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms,
Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 328 (6th Cir. 1998).
124. See Freeman, 709 F.3d at 251–53; Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century
Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Andersons, 166 F.3d at 325;
Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993).
125. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1132–33 (9th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 1133.
128. JAMS, a private dispute resolution organization, was previously referred to as Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. Today, however, the organization only uses the
acronym as its title. The JAMS Name, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/
[https://perma.cc/GM9V-TTQJ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
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organization specified in the agreement,129 and Monster was awarded $3
million in attorneys’ fees.130
Overturning that award in October 2019, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
Olympic’s claim that the JAMS arbitrator—retired California state judge
John W. Kennedy Jr.—had failed to adequately disclose his relationship to
JAMS and his firm’s relationship with Monster.131 The arbitrator provided
the parties with a multipage disclosure statement containing a provision
stating his general economic interest in the financial success of JAMS and
warning the parties that they should assume one or more JAMS neutrals had,
or would in the future, participate in another proceeding with one of the
parties.132 Judge Kennedy further disclosed that he had personally presided
over two previous arbitrations with Monster, one in which he ruled against
the beverage company.133
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion found the arbitrator’s disclosure inadequate
because he failed to disclose that his “economic interest” in JAMS was, in
fact, an ownership interest.134 The court ruled that “arbitrators are required
to disclose their ownership interests in the organizations they are affiliated
with and the organizations’ business dealings with the arbitration parties.”135
The opinion cited Justice White’s concurrence from Commonwealth
Coatings, emphasizing that when an arbitrator has a “substantial interest in a
firm which has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be
disclosed.”136 The court also noted that this formulation of the rule was
previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit.137 The opinion defined the Ninth
129. Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1132.
130. See id. at 1142 (Friedland, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 1132 (majority opinion).
132. See id. at 1133. The text of the disclosure reads:
I practice in association with JAMS. Each JAMS neutral, including me, has an
economic interest in the overall financial success of JAMS. In addition, because of
the nature and size of JAMS, the parties should assume that one or more of the other
neutrals who practice with JAMS has participated in an arbitration, mediation or
other dispute resolution proceeding with the parties, counsel or insurers in this case
and may do so in the future.
Id. A “neutral” is a “nonpartisan arbitrator typically selected by two other arbitrators—one of
whom has been selected by each side in the dispute.” Neutral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
133. See Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1139–40 (Friedland, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
in addition to making the standard JAMS disclosure, Judge Kennedy also disclosed that he
had arbitrated another dispute between Monster and a different distributer); id. at 1136
(majority opinion) (noting that Judge Kennedy’s prior arbitration involving Monster resulted
in an award of about $400,000 against Monster); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 13, at 10.
134. See Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1134.
135. Daniel Bornstein, Ninth Circuit, Overturning an Award, Backs More Arbitrator
Disclosure, 37 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 170, 170 (2019).
136. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1968)
(White, J., concurring).
137. See Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1135 (“In a concurrence, Justice White noted that
when an arbitrator has a ‘substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial
business with a party, that fact must be disclosed,’—a formulation of the rule that we have
adopted.” (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151–52 (White, J., concurring))).
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Circuit’s evident partiality rule as supporting vacatur of an arbitration award
when (1) an arbitrator’s undisclosed interest in an entity is substantial and (2)
that entity’s business dealings with one of the parties to the arbitration are
nontrivial.138
The court concluded that Judge Kennedy’s ownership interest in JAMS as
a co-owner was substantial because it afforded him a portion of profits from
all of its arbitrations, not just those he personally conducted.139 It further
held that because JAMS had administered ninety-seven arbitrations for
Monster over the past five years, their business dealings were more than
trivial.140
The court further cited state legislation and the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), adopted by several states within the circuit, which
require extensive disclosure by neutral arbitrators.141 In California,
arbitrators are required to disclose anything that might cause someone aware
of the facts to reasonably entertain doubt as to the arbitrator’s ability to be
impartial, including anything that would constitute grounds, under the
California Code of Civil Procedure, to disqualify a judge.142 The RUAA
requires disclosure of all facts a reasonable person would consider likely to
affect the arbitrator’s impartiality.143 It also establishes that there is a
presumption of evident partiality when an arbitrator does not disclose a
“known, direct and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding or a known, existing and substantial relationship with a party.”144
The Ninth Circuit vacated the arbitration award in favor of Monster, holding
that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose his ownership interest in JAMS created
a “reasonable impression of bias.”145
Monster petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, asking for clarification of the evident partiality standard and
whether that standard mandates vacatur for an arbitrator’s failure to disclose

138. See id. at 1135–36.
139. See id. at 1136. But see Brief of JAMS, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 11 n.6, Monster Energy, 940 F.3d 1130 (No. 19-1333) (“No owner-neutral has ever received
more than one-tenth of one percent of JAMS’s total revenue ($100 for every $100,000 of
revenue) in a single year, and that small revenue share is untethered to the revenue from any
specific party, lawyer, or law firm.”).
140. See Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1136.
141. See id. at 1136–37.
142. See id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a) (West 2021)). The court also cited
a section of the Montana Annotated Code, which requires the same. Id. (citing MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-5-116(3)–(4) (2021)).
143. See id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 36.650(1)(1) (2020)).
144. Id. at 1137 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3012(E) (2021)).
145. See id. at 1138. The court also expressed concern over bias in favor of “repeat players”
in arbitration, but because the “repeat player” phenomenon is an issue usually limited to
employment and consumer arbitration cases, it is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. (citing
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 189, 209–17 (1997)); Cameron, supra note 12, at 131 (noting that concerns about
bias in favor of “repeat players” usually arise in consumer and employment, as opposed to
commercial, arbitrations).
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a “de minimis ‘ownership interest’ in his arbitration firm . . . [which] has
conducted a ‘nontrivial’ number of arbitrations with one of the parties.”146
JAMS took an unprecedented step by filing an amicus brief in support of
Monster’s rehearing petition.147 It stressed that “[n]o owner-neutral has ever
received more than one-tenth of one percent of JAMS’s total revenue . . . in
a single year” and that the ninety-seven arbitrations it administered for
Monster over the previous thirteen years constituted only a miniscule
percentage of its entire business during that period.148 Furthermore, during
that same period, JAMS had also administered hundreds of arbitrations and
mediations for Olympic.149
JAMS elaborated on its measures to ensure its neutrals, whether they are
owners or not, are insulated from factors that could compromise their
impartiality150 and noted that the Ninth Circuit’s decision constituted a
departure from the existing rules and statutes regulating disclosures.151 No
existing standard, JAMS argued, required arbitrators to report not only their
own prior dealings with the parties in commercial arbitrations but all of the
provider’s prior dealings with the parties as well.152
The Court denied Monster’s petition,153 leaving standing the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling vacating the award.154 Since then, several cases with similar
facts have cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held the other way.155 For
example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which sits in the Third Circuit,

146. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at i.
147. See Brief of JAMS, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at
2–3 (“JAMS has always refrained from supporting or opposing challenges made by parties to
the arbitral process or to specific arbitration awards. . . . This case is the first time that JAMS
has ever filed an amicus brief in its forty-plus year history.”).
148. Id. at 11 n.6 (“[T]he revenue attributable to any one party in a given time period, even
a ‘repeat player,’ is a small fraction of the organization’s total revenues. For example, in the
13-year period in which JAMS administered 97 arbitrations involving Monster, it
administered approximately 127,785 total cases.”). JAMS also emphasized that arbitrators
receive no financial incentives to deliver particular outcomes, to create or retain relationships
with customers, or for repeat business generated from clients they have administered
arbitrations for in the past. Id. at 11–12. Arbitrators, like judges, also have legal immunity to
protect them from possible reprisals from dissatisfied parties as a means of maintaining their
neutrality. Id. at 12.
149. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 35 (“JAMS administered 93
arbitrations . . . and 429 mediations for one of Olympic’s law firms and 28 arbitrations . . . and
157 mediations for Olympic’s other law firm.”).
150. See Brief of JAMS, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at
11–12.
151. See id. at 6–7.
152. See id. at 7.
153. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
154. See Heather Cameron, Monster Energy and Evident Partiality, CPR SPEAKS (June 29,
2020), https://blog.cpradr.org/2020/06/29/monster-energy-and-evident-partiality/ [https://
perma.cc/RL2J-QUSB].
155. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aqua Dynamics Sys., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1005
(N.D. Cal. 2020); Martin v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 20-CV-0686, 2020 WL 3429423, at *9 (E.D.
Pa. June 23, 2020); Raley v. Daniel K. Hagood, P.C., No. 05-18-00914-CV, 2019 WL
5781916, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App. Nov. 6, 2019).
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held in Martin v. NTT Data, Inc.156 that though an arbitrator’s failure or
refusal to disclose an apparent interest or conflict might constitute
compelling evidence of evident partiality, a party wishing to challenge an
award on that basis must still produce “proof so powerfully suggestive of bias
that a reasonable person would have to believe that [the arbitrator] was
partial.”157 Although the court categorized the arbitrator’s nondisclosure as
“blatant and indefensible,” it declined to vacate the award in question for
evident partiality, in part, because it found the petitioner’s failure to question
the arbitrator’s nondisclosures and potential bias until after the award was
issued, suggestive of an attempt to “game the system” in the face of an
unfavorable outcome.158
The Supreme Court’s decision not to grant certiorari in Monster Energy
left the issue unsettled, meaning courts are likely to continue deciding evident
partiality cases inconsistently between the circuits by applying different
standards.159
III. THE POSSIBLE IMPRESSION STANDARD EX ANTE, LIKELY ACTUAL
BIAS EX POST
Rather than advocating wholesale for one standard or the other, this Note
proposes a compromise, arguing for applying the likely actual bias standard
ex post to evident partiality challenges and the possible impression standard
ex ante to arbitrator disclosures.160 This solution would ensure that awards
156. No. 20-CV-0686, 2020 WL 3429423 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2020), appeal dismissed, No.
20-2717 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2021).
157. Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (quoting Stone v. Bear, Stearns, 872 F. Supp. 2d 435,
447 (E.D. Pa. 2012)). The court listed four factors, used in the Second and Fourth Circuits, to
help determine whether the standard for evident partiality has been met. Id. These factors are
“(1) The extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the arbitrator
in the proceedings; (2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and the party
he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitrator; and (4) the
proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding.” Id.
158. See id. at *9.
159. Compare Biotronik, Inc. v. Fry, No. 20-cv-00094, 2020 WL 5541074, at *3 (D. Or.
Aug. 5, 2020) (“An arbitrator has a duty to investigate and disclose potential conflicts, and the
‘failure to disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias’
is sufficient to support vacatur.” (quoting New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films,
Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007))), with Martin, 2020 WL 3429423, at *6 (“[T]here
absolutely is a duty to disclose on the part of arbitrators and/or potential arbitrators, although
‘failure to disclose, in and of itself, is not a basis for vacating an arbitration award.’ Instead,
non-disclosure ‘has relevance in the vacatur context only to the extent that the non-disclosure
reveals evident partiality.’” (quoting Stone v. Bear, Stearns, 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 447 (E.D.
Pa. 2012))).
160. Clarification on the standard for disclosures is necessary because although providers’
guidelines for arbitrators encourage them to err on the side of more disclosure when there
might be a conflict, the rules do not explicitly state an applicable standard for evaluating
whether such disclosures are required or if failure to disclose a particular fact merits
disqualification or recusal. For example, the AAA advises arbitrators not to judge the
significance of potential conflicts for themselves but rather to disclose any and all possible
conflicts and contacts to the parties and allow them to decide the significance for themselves.
See A. Kelly Turner, The What, Why, and How of Arbitrator Disclosures, AM. ARB. ASS’N
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.adr.org/blog/the-what-why-and-how-of-arbitrator-disclosures
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meant to be final and binding cannot be easily overturned for evident
partiality without showing, to a high degree of likelihood, that the arbitrator
was indeed biased in favor of one of the parties, while simultaneously
promoting educated decision-making by the parties and a high degree of
transparency in the proceedings.
This approach is also appealing from an international perspective.
Adopting the likely actual bias standard for vacatur would be in better
keeping with the global trend for judicial review.161 In light of commercial
arbitration’s international nature, it is somewhat impractical to hold
arbitrators to judicial standards that are conceived of in specific domestic
contexts and are, therefore, necessarily culturally specific.162 Maintaining a
high bar for vacatur while adopting stricter disclosure standards aligns with
international parties’ expectations that they will be able to define and control

[https://perma.cc/B4Z7-4FP7]. However, the language actually used in the rules suggests a
standard more akin to likely actual bias than possible impression. Both the AAA’s and
JAMS’s commercial arbitration rules direct arbitrators to disclose circumstances “likely to
give rise to justifiable doubt as to the [a]rbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES r. 17(a) (AM. ARB. ASS’N
2013); see JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES r. 15(h) (JAMS 2014).
161. See BORN, supra note 16, at 1787 (“[T]he trend in recent years has . . . been away from
equating or linking standards of impartiality of international arbitrators to those of national
court judges.”). For example, the standard in England, which serves as a model for the
common-law approach and has influenced African and Asian countries’ arbitration practices,
considers “whether a ‘fair-minded and informed observer’ would conclude that there was a
‘real possibility’ that the arbitral tribunal was not impartial.” Feehily, supra note 26, at 100;
see also Pedro Sousa Uva, A Comparative Reflection on Challenge of Arbitral Awards
Through the Lens of the Arbitrator’s Duty of Impartiality and Independence, 20 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 479, 481 (2009). A successful challenge under that system requires demonstrating
circumstances that give rise to “justifiable doubts as to [the arbitrator’s] impartiality.” See id.
at 486 (quoting Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 24(1)(a) (UK)); see also Halliburton Co. v.
Chubb Berm. Ins. Ltd. [2020] UKSC 48 (appeal taken from Eng.) (confirming that English
law applies an objective test to determine whether there are justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality by asking whether a fair-minded and informed observer would
conclude there is a real possibility of bias). “English law establishes a high threshold, making
it difficult to uphold a request for annulment of an award rendered by an allegedly biased
arbitrator.” Uva, supra, at 487. In France—which has influenced legislation in Middle Eastern
and some African countries—courts only interfere under extreme circumstances, declining to
set aside awards for impartiality unless the arbitrator failed to comply with due process. See
id. at 481, 499; see also Seung-Woon Lee, Arbitrator’s Evident Partiality: Current U.S.
Standards and Possible Solutions Based on Comparative Reviews, 9 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 159, 169–70 (2017). The French approach balances this practice by applying strict
standards on the duty to disclose. See Lee, supra, at 170. Similarly, Germany, which follows
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law
approach and has an impact on Japanese and Chinese legislation, only allows courts to set
aside awards for an arbitrator’s lack of impartiality or independence under circumstances “that
would lead an objective third party to consider that an arbitrator was acting in the interest of
one party.” See Uva, supra, at 481, 495. On the other hand, Australia and South Africa, though
common-law jurisdictions like England, have adopted somewhat less demanding standards,
allowing vacatur for a “reasonable suspicion” or “apprehension” of bias. See Feehily, supra
note 26, at 100–01.
162. See Feehily, supra note 26, at 109–10 (“The fragmented framework of international
arbitration depends on more fluid processes for the selection of decision makers and for vetting
their integrity.”).

2254

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

their arbitrations, encourages the parties’ full and informed consent during
the selection process, and protects their interest in final and binding awards.
Part III.A critically evaluates the standards for vacatur used by the majority
and minority circuits, arguing for the likely actual bias standard for
evaluating vacatur under § 10(a)(2) of the FAA. Part III.B calls on the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the issue to clarify that likely actual bias
is the correct standard ex post. Part III.C argues for applying the possible
impression standard to the determination of which disclosures arbitrators are
required to make and proposes a private law solution, including a system that
shifts the burden to investigate an arbitrator’s disclosures onto the parties ex
ante.
A. A Case for the Likely Actual Bias Standard to Vacate for Evident
Partiality
Both the possible impression and the likely actual bias standard offer
valuable protection for key features of arbitration. Possible impression
focuses on maintaining a high standard of neutrality and fairness in the
process, while the likely actual bias standard tempers that concern with the
countervailing interests of independence from courts and the finality of
awards.
What courts applying either standard fail to do is distinguish between two
distinct, yet overlapping concerns. Courts adopting the possible impression
standard are primarily concerned with disclosures arbitrators must make
before arbitration, while courts adopting the likely actual bias standard focus
more heavily on the bar for vacatur of an award after the arbitration is
complete.
Adopting a higher bar for parties moving to have an award vacated for
evident partiality runs the risk of making justice more difficult for a party
that truly was placed, without prior knowledge, at an unfair disadvantage due
to an arbitrator’s bias. A lower bar, on the other hand, runs the not-at-allspeculative risk163 of opening a window for parties—like the bank in this
Note’s introductory hypothetical164—to succeed on bad faith attempts to
overturn awards, not because they really believe the arbitrator was biased in
favor of the other party but because they hope to get “a second bite at the
apple.”165
As noted by the Third Circuit, a plain reading of § 10’s text seems to
suggest something more than the mere possibility of partiality is required to
vacate an award.166 “Evident,” after all, means “clear to the vision or
understanding” with synonyms like “manifest,” “obvious,” “apparent,” and

8.

163. See Brief of JAMS, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at

164. See Korland, supra note 1; supra note 1 and accompanying text.
165. Martin v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 20-CV-0686, 2020 WL 3429423, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June
23, 2020) (quoting Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir.
2013)).
166. See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 2013).
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“plain.”167 “Evident implies presence of visible signs that lead one to a
definite conclusion.”168 Saying “the child spoke with evident anguish about
losing her doll” does not mean the same thing as “she spoke with possible
anguish about losing her doll.” “Evident anguish” is clear, obvious, and
apparent. Though somewhat clumsy sounding, a more accurate restatement
of the first sentence would be “the child spoke with likely actual anguish
about losing her doll.”
The noscitur a sociis canon of statutory interpretation169 also weighs in
favor of interpreting evident partiality as requiring a showing of likely actual
bias.170 The other grounds for vacatur under § 10 of the FAA are corruption,
fraud, undue means, misconduct or misbehavior that prejudiced the rights of
one of the parties, and an arbitrator exceeding one’s powers.171 Courts apply
high standards of proof to petitioners seeking vacatur of an arbitral award
under all of § 10’s other grounds.172
For vacatur to be appropriate under § 10(a)(1), a petitioner must show that
it is “abundantly clear”173 that the arbitration award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means.174 Under § 10(a)(3), an award can only
be set aside for an arbitrator’s procedural misconduct if it is “in bad faith or
so gross as to amount to affirmative misconduct.”175 To show that an award
must be overturned, a party seeking vacatur under § 10(a)(4) “bears a heavy
burden.”176 Such a party is required to do more than show that the arbitrator
“committed an error—or even a serious error.”177
167. See Evident, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
evident [https://perma.cc/H9F9-HCHS] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
168. Id.
169. Noscitur a sociis is Latin for “it is known by its associates.” Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). It is a “canon of construction holding that the meaning of
an unclear word or phrase, esp. one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately
surrounding it.” Id.
170. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 27 (citing United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008)).
171. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4).
172. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (“Sections 10
and 11 [of the FAA] . . . address egregious departures from the parties’ agreed-upon
arbitration.”); Simons v. Brown, 444 F. Supp. 3d 642, 650–51 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Each of the
[§ 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4)] grounds upon which [the petitioner] asks me to vacate the award
requires a steep climb over difficult terrain.”); see also Brian T. Burns, Freedom, Finality, and
Federal Preemption: Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State
Law After Hall Street, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1813, 1845 (2010) (“Section 10’s grounds for
vacatur—‘corruption,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘evident partiality,’ and the like—deal with ‘egregious’ and
‘outrageous conduct.’” (quoting Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 586)).
173. EB Safe, LLC v. Hurley, 832 F. App’x 705, 708 (2d. Cir. 2020) (quoting Karppinen
v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1951)).
174. Id. (“To warrant vacatur . . . the petitioner must establish that: ‘(1) respondent
engaged in fraudulent activity; (2) even with the exercise of due diligence, petitioner could
not have discovered the fraud prior to the award issuing; and (3) the fraud materially related
to an issue in the arbitration.’” (quoting Odeon Cap. Grp. LLC v. Ackerman, 864 F.3d 191,
196 (2d Cir. 2017))).
175. Simons, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 651 (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987)).
176. See id. at 654 (quoting Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569 (2013)).
177. Id.
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All of the § 10 grounds for vacatur, including evident partiality, are aimed
at protecting parties from unfairly obtained awards.178 In light of the heavy
burden on petitioners seeking vacatur under any other provision in § 10,
allowing an award to be overturned for the mere possibility of an arbitrator’s
bias seems like a policy choice rather than a faithful reading of the text of the
statute. The majority rule then, likely actual bias, seems to more accurately
capture the intent of § 10(a)(2).
There is also a straightforward policy argument to be made for maintaining
a high standard for finding evident partiality. Allowing courts to vacate
arbitral awards for evident partiality under limited circumstances serves the
dual purpose of (1) promoting justice by allowing courts to overturn awards
made by arbitrators who are actually biased and (2) preserving popular
confidence in commercial arbitration as a fair and equitable institution by
maintaining the appearance of impartiality. Between those two goals,
however, the more salient concern is ensuring that parties are not forced to
abide by arbitral awards decided by adjudicators who are actually biased in
favor of the other party. Since the likely actual bias standard is geared toward
addressing those situations, while continuing to promote finality, it
constitutes the better compromise.
B. Clarification from the Supreme Court Is Needed
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to confirm that likely actual
bias is the correct standard for determining when an arbitral award may be
vacated for evident partiality.179 Determining who is right about which
Justice penned the controlling opinion in Commonwealth Coatings is a
complicated area of the law and worth examining but beyond the scope of
this Note.180 It is also, ultimately, less important than the relevant substantive
question—which standard constitutes the more faithful reading of § 10(a)(2)
and the wiser policy choice in light of today’s commercial arbitration
landscape?181
As discussed above in Part III.A, a plain reading of § 10(a)’s text weighs
heavily in favor of the likely actual bias interpretation of the evident partiality
178. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4).
179. While a congressional amendment to the FAA might also be an effective means of
clarifying the evident partiality standard, finding that such an amendment is less likely, this
Note focuses instead on resolution in the Supreme Court. A proposed amendment to § 10(a)
was introduced in the Senate on February 28, 2019. See S. 635, 116th Cong. § 4 (2019). The
proposed amendment had failed to pass in Congress as of December 31, 2020. US S635,
BILLTRACK50, https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1091878 [https://perma.cc/4VTR4595] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). Considering that a plain reading of § 10’s text supports the
likely actual bias standard, an amendment is not necessary to correct its wording. See supra
Part III.A. All that is needed is clarification of the proper interpretation, and interpretation of
the law is one of the Court’s core functions. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 257
(2020). Furthermore, in light of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration stance, the Court seems
likely to favor a policy that would minimize the need for and the courts’ ability to administer
judicial review of arbitral awards. See Cameron, supra note 12, at 132.
180. See supra note 48.
181. See supra note 48.
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standard, and the Supreme Court favors textualist interpretations.182
Furthermore, should the Court find that Justice Black’s lower possible
impression standard is, in fact, the binding law to come out of
Commonwealth Coatings, it is the only court with the authority to overrule
that precedent.183
Commonwealth Coatings was decided in 1968 and commercial arbitration
has changed significantly since then.184 Many of the world’s largest and
busiest arbitral institutions were not established until just before or well after
Commonwealth Coatings was decided.185 Today’s Court would be able to
consider standardized contract clauses providing for arbitration administered
by a particular provider and the subsequent questions about the repeat
business to which it gives rise. Monster Energy involved repeat business
connections between an arbitral provider and a large corporation that was one
of the parties to arbitration.186 The court found evident partiality on the
grounds of the arbitrator’s failure to disclose his interest in the provider that
had connections with a party, not on the basis of a failure to disclose his own
direct connections or business relationships with that party.187 That sort of
indirect connection was not a factor in Commonwealth Coatings.188
As a policy matter, the Court could also consider private law solutions,
such as the one proposed in Part III.C below. Because there are other viable
means of protecting parties from decisions made by possibly biased

182. See Joseph S. Diedrich, A Jurist’s Language of Interpretation, WIS. LAW., July/Aug.
2020, at 36, 37.
183. See Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action
by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 53–54 (1982); Stare Decisis,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184. See Cameron, supra note 12, at 131 (discussing the rise in prevalence of contracts
calling for arbitration administered by particular arbitral providers, increasing the likelihood
that large companies will participate in a great number of arbitrations with the same provider,
and noting that this has significantly complicated the judiciary’s ability to determine what
constitutes a “nontrivial” versus a “trivial” number of arbitrations); David Horton & Andrea
Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104
GEO. L.J. 57, 67–70 (2015).
185. See, e.g., About HKIAC, H.K. INT’L ARB. CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/95L6-X3LK] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021) (noting its founding in 1985);
About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/
About/ICSID [https://perma.cc/W6K3-W9P9] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021) (noting its founding
in 1966); About Us, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/C3R2-C35W]
(last visited Mar. 16, 2021) (noting its founding in 1979); Highlights, SING. INT’L ARB. CTR.,
https://www.siac.org.sg/64-why-siac [https://perma.cc/TTQ5-UNJ7] (last visited Mar. 16,
2021) (noting its founding in 1991); History, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL.,
https://www.cpradr.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/6T2N-7QQG] (last visited Mar. 16,
2021) (noting its founding in 1977).
186. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.).
187. See id.
188. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
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arbitrations, the Court would likely find no compelling reason to depart from
§ 10(a)(2)’s plain meaning.189
C. A Place for the Possible Impression Standard in Disclosure Guidelines
It is wholly consistent to apply different partiality standards ex ante and ex
post. Applying the possible impression standard before arbitration would
require that arbitrators disclose everything they subjectively know would
meet the very strict judicial standard for impartiality. Applying the likely
actual bias standard after arbitration would mean declining to automatically
vacate an award because one of the parties uncovers something ex post that
the arbitrator was not aware of but that would conceivably have met that strict
judicial standard for disclosure.
To adequately address concerns about fairness to the parties, particularly
in light of a standard that imposes a higher bar for establishing evident
partiality after an award has been made, more clarity is needed regarding
arbitrator disclosures.190 A clear and uniform list of required disclosures
would ensure that parties are able to make fully informed decisions before
settling on an adjudicator. It would help arbitrators confidently make
disclosures without fear that their integrity will be called into question down
the line or that their awards will be thrown out. It would also narrow the
number of situations where a court would be required to make a judgment
call on whether certain additional undisclosed information constitutes
sufficient evidence of evident partiality.191
Arbitral providers could organize committees comprised of practitioners,
experts, and interested industry members to compile such a disclosure list.
In addition to a list of universal disclosure requirements built by referencing
current standards and relevant court decisions,192 committees could build

189. Outside the United States, various jurisdictions have balanced an approach that sets a
higher bar for vacating an award based on an arbitrator’s bias with strict disclosure obligations.
See Feehily, supra note 26, at 102–03.
190. “[A]rbitrators have only the phrase ‘impression of possible bias’ as a guide to
disclosure. The phrase itself offers little practical assistance; it is an amorphous guide whose
contours are developed by judges in a post hoc determination of what an arbitrator should have
disclosed.” Matthew David Disco, Note, The Impression of Possible Bias: What A Neutral
Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 116 (1993).
191. Considering that clear disclosure requirements would help protect the legitimacy of
arbitration, this endeavor also aligns with the Court’s pro-arbitration stance and would help
further justify the Court in adopting a more difficult-to-meet standard for evident partiality.
See Cameron, supra note 12, at 132; supra Parts III.A–B.
192. As a starting point, committees may consult the International Bar Association’s (IBA)
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Commercial Arbitration. See Feehily,
supra note 26, at 111. In addition to general standards, the IBA guidelines include a
nonexhaustive list of circumstances that might require disclosure, categorizing them according
to the colors on a traffic light to indicate the likelihood that they would give rise to doubts
about partiality. Id. The red list includes circumstances that present serious conflicts of
interest and is divided between those that are waivable by the parties and those that are
nonwaivable. Id. at 112. Circumstances on the orange list are ones that arbitrators are required
to disclose, and the green list includes circumstances unlikely to raise questions of impartiality
and independence that, therefore, do not require disclosure. Id.
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industry-specific lists by consulting individuals within those fields to find out
what kind of relationships might make them question an arbitrator’s
impartiality. Direct pecuniary interest in the outcome should certainly
qualify as a universally required disclosure,193 but it is possible that,
depending on a particular industry’s size and practices, the degree of
connection or number of prior business relationships industry members find
acceptable may vary.194
Using such a disclosure list as a guide, arbitrators should then be required
to disclose any and all sources of potential bias of which they are subjectively
aware. Arbitrators should be instructed to err on the side of disclosure if they
are unsure whether a particular relationship or fact might warrant inclusion.
This Note’s proposal differs from existing scholarship in that, rather than
imposing an affirmative obligation on arbitrators to investigate their own
potential sources of bias or neglecting to address the problem posed by
possible biases arbitrators do not actually know about, it recommends that
parties should be required to investigate such possible biases to their own
satisfaction.195 It is inefficient and somewhat counterintuitive to ask
arbitrators to investigate their own potential bias. Arbitrators, like everyone
else, are likely to overestimate their own ability to be impartial.196 They can
disclose what they subjectively know or believe might compromise their
impartiality, but the parties’ judgments about an arbitrator’s impartiality are
what ultimately matter because they have the power to object to an

193. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring); see also
Korland, supra note 1, at 816 (“Examples of such conflicts are numerous and can include
situations where an arbitrator has prior or current financial dealings with a party to the
arbitration, an employee of a party to the arbitration, counsel for a party to the arbitration, or
a witness who appears during the course of the arbitration. Additionally, an arbitrator can
have potential conflicts that stem from family relationships or social contacts with the
disputants. Attorneys or businesspeople may also face conflicts based on current or past
professional associates having dealings with the parties to the arbitration.”).
194. See BORN, supra note 16, at 1779 (“[T]he acceptable degree of risk of partiality should
vary depending on the circumstances of particular cases.”); Feehily, supra note 26, at 110.
195. See Korland, supra note 1, at 832–35 (proposing a system where arbitrators are
encouraged to investigate their own potential sources of bias, and a party wishing to maintain
an arbitration award that has been challenged for evident partiality can make an affirmative
defense by showing that the arbitrator made a reasonable attempt to investigate and did not
have knowledge of the conflict); Lee, supra note 161, at 176 (proposing that parties
incorporate the IBA guidelines into their agreements and courts use its color-coded system to
determine whether particular failures to disclose constitute impartiality but failing to address
how the IBA guidelines would help courts address sources of bias that the arbitrator did not
disclose due to lack of actual knowledge); Windsor, supra note 30, at 213–14 (proposing an
affirmative legal duty on arbitrators to investigate their own potential conflicts before
arbitration).
196. See Adam Alter, The Persistent Illusion of Impartiality, PSYCH. TODAY (June 2, 2010),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/alternative-truths/201006/the-persistent-illusionimpartiality [https://perma.cc/RHQ2-3G8X]; Joan Stearns Johnsen, Why Your Arbitrator Is
Biased, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2015/why-your-arbitrator-is-biased/
[https://perma.cc/Z33W-A47E].
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arbitrator’s appointment197 and would ultimately be the ones to move for
vacatur after an award has been issued.
Considering an arbitrator’s livelihood as such depends on their reputation
for impartiality, a system where parties are charged with investigating the
arbitrator’s disclosures would provide an effective pre-arbitration check on
the adequacy of the arbitrator’s disclosures and give parties a chance to make
informed and explicit decisions about any facts that might compromise the
arbitrator’s judgment. If, during the course of its investigation, a party
discovers a potential source of conflict that the arbitrator was apparently
unaware of, and therefore did not disclose, the party may then decide whether
it is significant enough to warrant objecting to the arbitrator’s appointment.
If a party discovers something it does not reasonably believe the arbitrator
could have been unaware of but which the arbitrator did not disclose, the
party would be free to object to the arbitrator before the arbitration begins.198
In the case of an honest mistake or misunderstanding, the arbitrator may
be able to provide further context or explanation to assuage the party’s
concerns. In cases where an arbitrator truly was trying to conceal something,
being caught would likely be sufficiently embarrassing and professionally
awkward to encourage the arbitrator to make adequate disclosures in the
future.199 As an additional measure, arbitral providers could keep their own
records of such undisclosed information discovered by parties and require
arbitrators to make such disclosures in the future or, if they believe a genuine
ethical concern has been raised, reconsider the arbitrator’s place on their
roster.
With this pre-arbitration system in place, after an award has been made, it
should be vacated only if a reasonable person would conclude, to a high
degree of certainty, that the arbitrator was in fact biased. The high bar for
vacatur under § 10(a)(2) would no longer pose the same risk of subjecting
parties to unfair awards simply because they cannot prove likely actual, as
opposed to merely possible, bias. The affirmative duty to investigate would
reveal easily discoverable possible bias ahead of time and allow parties to
object.
In case of relationships or connections that are likely to bias an arbitrator
but were not disclosed or easily discoverable by the parties during the course
197. Arbitral providers, like the AAA, may also determine on their own initiative that an
arbitrator should be disqualified. See Review Standards, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_AdminReviewCounsel_S
tandards.pdf [https://perma.cc/67ME-ZRRC] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
198. An arbitrator’s duty to disclose potential sources of bias continues throughout the
duration of arbitration. See Feehily, supra note 26, at 100. This means that if a new source of
bias arises out of a new or existing connection or relationship, or the arbitrator becomes aware
of a possible conflict they did not recognize as such when making initial disclosures, they are
required to disclose that fact to the parties. “Any party can make an objection to an arbitrator
at any time in the arbitration, up to the issuance of the Award or other terminating order.”
Review Standards, supra note 197.
199. See Brief of JAMS, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at
12 (noting that every neutral has an interest in providing high quality service to the parties so
that even the losing party and their counsel will consider appointing them in future matters).
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of investigation, parties would still be able to move for vacatur for evident
partiality. However, knowing that the mere possible impression of bias is
insufficient, the standard’s higher bar would mean parties would be less
likely to go on fishing expeditions in the wake of unfavorable awards,
looking for anything that could be used as grounds for vacatur.200
This proposed solution would have yielded a better outcome in Monster
Energy. A prescribed list of mandatory disclosures could have included
ownership interest in one’s firm, however small, meaning that Judge
Kennedy would have known he was required to disclose that fact in addition
to the standard disclosures he did make.201 As it stood, no existing rules,
standards, or statute required disclosure of the arbitrator’s small ownership
interest in the arbitration provider.202
Judge Kennedy likely did not disclose his ownership interest because he
did not subjectively believe there was any reason his owner status would in
any way bias him in favor of either party.203 Inferring that an arbitrator
would be biased in favor of one of the parties because he had a small, general
ownership interest in the provider administering the arbitration is, at most, a
possible source of bias but not a highly likely one. Had Olympic had an
affirmative duty to investigate the arbitrator’s potential bias, their
investigation would likely have revealed that Judge Kennedy, like many
other JAMS arbitrators, was an owner and that JAMS had administered
several arbitrations for Monster in the recent past.204 If, upon such discovery,
Olympic had doubted Judge Kennedy’s explanation for failing to include that
information in his disclosures, Olympic would have been free to object to his
appointment.
This proposal could be implemented on a national level by amending the
FAA to include the possible impression standard for disclosures, but
considering that the amendment process is slow and difficult, this Note does
not focus on it.205 A state law solution might also be an effective means of
implementing this Note’s proposal insofar as those state laws do not conflict
with a reading of the FAA that requires likely actual bias to find evident
partiality.206 In Monster Energy, the Ninth Circuit noted that several states
in the circuit had adopted the RUAA, which specifically addresses
requirements for arbitrator disclosures and evident partiality.207 However,

3.

200. Id. at 8.
201. See supra Part III.B.
202. See Brief of JAMS, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at

203. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 35 (noting that the fact JAMS
is owned by some of its neutrals is publicly available on the JAMS website); see also supra
note 199.
204. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 10–11.
205. See supra note 179.
206. A state law attempting to impose a different evident partiality standard would be
preempted by the FAA and, therefore, invalid. REVISED UNIF. ARB. ACT para. 3 (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2000).
207. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1136–37 (9th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 164 (2020) (mem.).
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existing model laws do not impose the possible impression standard on
disclosures or an affirmative duty on the parties to investigate.208
Private adoption by arbitral providers would likely be effective and much
faster. Most providers already impose extensive disclosure requirements on
arbitrators209 and they can—and do—update their rules and guidelines as
needed.210 Private arbitral entities are likely to willingly adopt the possible
impression standard for disclosures without requiring regulation because it
would not be a great departure from their current practices and would
increase parties’ faith in the institution’s neutrality. Implementing this
proposal would simply require adding language to provider rules informing
parties and arbitrators of the standard and of the parties’ affirmative duty to
investigate, including the rights and responsibilities that duty entails.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision about the FAA’s evident partiality standard
in Commonwealth Coatings left courts with little guidance, leading to a
circuit split and a robust debate. Between the two commonly used standards
for determining when vacatur is appropriate under § 10(a)(2) of the FAA, the
likely actual bias standard is a more accurate reading of the law. It is also a
better policy choice, considering arbitration’s competing interests of fairness
and finality. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to clarify the high
bar evident partiality sets for overturning arbitral awards.
To protect parties from the harm of awards made by potentially biased
arbitrators, providers should implement a private law solution that explicitly
invokes the possible impression standard in their disclosure guidelines.
208. The RUAA imposes the likely actual bias standard on disclosures and an affirmative
duty to investigate on the arbitrator. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (“Before
accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making
a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would
consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in that arbitration proceeding.”).
States could also adopt the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but they also only require
disclosure of “circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts,” which is not as broad a
requirement as the possible impression standard. See G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 11 (Dec. 6, 2010).
209. See Cameron, supra note 12, at 132 (discussing what has been referred to as JAMS’s
“platinum” disclosure standards); see, e.g., ARBITRATION RULES art. 11.2 (INT’L CHAMBER
COM. 2021) (“The prospective arbitrator shall disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts
or circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s
independence in the eyes of the parties, as well as any circumstances that could give rise to
reasonable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality.”); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES art. 13 (INT’L CTR. DISP. RESOL. 2014); JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION
RULES & PROCEDURES r. 15(h) (JAMS 2014) (“The Parties and their representatives shall
disclose to JAMS any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the Arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or personal interest in the
result of the Arbitration or any past or present relationship with the Parties or their
representatives. The obligation of the Arbitrator, the Parties and their representatives to make
all required disclosures continues throughout the Arbitration process.”).
210. Cameron, supra note 12, at 132 (noting that JAMS, the International Institute for
Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and the AAA were all reevaluating their disclosure
requirements following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Monster Energy).
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Providers should also adopt an explicit, industry-sensitive set of disclosure
requirements for arbitrators and impose an affirmative duty on parties to
investigate—to their own satisfaction—the sufficiency of arbitrators’
disclosures.
Under this system, the arbitrator overseeing the bank’s arbitration in this
Note’s introduction would have known whether she was required to disclose
that she had once held an account with them, however long ago. The bank
would have known what guidelines the arbitrator was using and that if it
thought the required disclosures were incomplete or if it were in any way
dissatisfied with her disclosures, it was the bank’s responsibility to
investigate further before an award was made. If the bank failed to make a
timely objection to the arbitrator, any resulting decision or award would be
protected—as intended by the FAA—from the bank’s bad faith attempt to
vacate for evident partiality.

